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DISABILITY LAW-THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED ASSISTANCE 
AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT IS ALIVE AND WELL AND LIVING IN NEW 
HAMPSHIRE-Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Cent~r, Inc. v. 
Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (Ist Cir. 1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of the events that led to the filing of Developmental 
Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton 1 (DDAC) began on July 
1, 198J2 began on April 12, 1978 when Garrity v. Gallen 3 was filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, 
by six mentally retarded residents of Laconia State School (LSS).4 
Plaintiffs in Garrity alleged violations of the United States Constitu­
tion and both federal and state law on behalf of themselves and 
other similarly situated mentally retarded citizens of the State of 
New Hampshire.s The suit attacked the conditions and practices at 
LSS and sought injunctive relief under The Develop~ental1y Dis­
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act6 (DD Act), the nondiscrimi­
nation section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 and the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act. 8 Plaintiffs sought a ruling which 
would require that their right to habilitation9 be respected and that 
they be placed in the least restrictive placement; 10 a community 
I. 521 F. Supp. 365 (D.N.H. 1981), vaca/~d in pari and remanded, 689 F.2d 281 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
2.. Brief of Harold Tuttle, Alice Graham and Lillian Cook, Residents of Laconia 
State School at 7, DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir: 1982). 
3. 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N .H. 1981). 
4. Jd at 176. 
5. Jd at 175-76. 
6. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81). 
7. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (Supp. V 1981). 
8. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 & Supp. V·1981). 
9. "Habilitation" is a term of art that refers to the education, training and care 
persons with retardation require to achieve their maximum development. 522 F. Supp. 
at 176 n.IO. 
10. A least restrictive placement is considered to be one of the basic rights of per­
sons with mental retardation. This right can be viewed as the right of the person to live 
in an environment as close as possible to that of the mainstream of society. Such an 
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placement .. I Joining the action was the New Hampshire Associa­
tion for Retarded Citizens, and, as plaintiff intervenor, the United 
States of America. 12 
The trial was long and involved.13 LSS was subject to a con­
stant flow of visitors pursuant to the trial. These visitors included 
attorneys, experts, and others involved in the litigation. 14 In re­
sponse to this steady stream of visitors, the administration of LSS 
implemented a procedure by which visitors were required to report 
to the administration building, and if they were not "parents, rela­
tives, legal guardians, court-appointed representatives, or other offi­
cial representatives, or lacked documented proof to visit," the visit 
would be denied. IS At the request of The Developmental Disabili­
ties Advocacy Center (DDAC), the independent agency charged by 
federal statute to protect the rights of the developmentally disabled 16 
of New Hampshire and to provide advocacy services to this popula­
tion,17 formal visitation regulations were promulgated by the office 
of the Attorney General. 18 DDAC, however, contended that the reg­
ulations as promulgated were unsatisfactory as "they contravene 
both statutorily and constitutionally established rights of the parties 
environment could be for the person to live with his or her own family. Herr, The New 
Clients: Legal Servicesfor Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 560 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Herr, TIre New Clients). 
11. The term "community placement" was used in reference to residential parents' 
homes, foster homes and group homes. 522 F. Supp. at 176 n.lI. 
12. Id 
13. The Garril)' litigation took place in a forty-one day trial during the spring and 
summer of 1980. Id at 175; DDAC v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. at 367 n.1. 
14. DDAC v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. at 367. 
15. Id 
16. As presently defined, 
(7) The term 'developmental disability' means a severe, chronic disability 
of a person which­
(A) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of 
mental and physical impairments; 
(8) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two; 
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely; 
(D) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the 
following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (ii) receptive and expressive 
language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direction, (vi) capacity for in­
dependent living, and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; and 
(E) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special, 
interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of life­
long or extended duration, and are individually planned and coordinated. 
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. IV 1980). In this note, the concepts, as discussed, apply to the 
developmentally disabled and to persons with mental illness. 
17. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
18. 521 F. Supp. at 367. The regulations provide as follows: 
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PART He-M 802 VISITS TO CLIENTS AT LACONIA STATE SCHOOL. 
He-M 802.01 Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to outline the policy 
and procedures for visits to clients who live at Laconia state school. 
He-M 802.02 Definition. The words and phrases used in this section shall 
mean the following, except where a different meaning is specified or clearly 
intended from the context. The use of the masculine form includes the femi­
nine throughout. 
(a) "Administrator" means the superintendent at Laconia state school. 
(b) "Appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body" means a team in­
cluding at least a program coordinator or case manager and a psychologist. 
This team may also include other retardation professionals and other persons 
concerned with the welfare of the client. 
(c) "Client" means a recipient of services at Laconia state school. 
(d) "Division" means the division of mental health and developmental 
services. 
(e) " "Family member" means the child, brother, sister. spouse. grandpar­
ent, grandchild, step-parent, aunt, uncle or cousin of the client. 
(f) "Guardian" means a guardian of the person or a temporary guardian 
of the person appointed under RSA 464-A. 
(g) "Laconia state school" means the Laconia state school and training 
center in Laconia, New Hampshire. 
(h) "Parent" means a natural or adoptive parent whose parental rights 
have not been terminated or limited by judicial decree. 
(i) "Program coordinator" means a qualified mental retardation" profes­
sional who has been designated as administratively responsible for the opera­
tion of a given residential unit at Laconia state school. 
(j) "Representative" means an individual who is in a position to safe­
guard the client's interests and who has been designated the client's representa­
tive under RSA 171-A:2. 
He-M 802.03 Policy. 
(a) Clients have a right to receive visitors: Clients also have a right to IX: 
free from unwanted visitors or intrusion. 
(b) Visits to the client by parents, family members, guardians, court ap­
pointed attorneys, representatives and personal physicians are strongly en­
couraged. 
(c) All visitors should make every effort to interfere as little as possible 
with programs and services to clients. Therefore, although visits will be al­
lowed at any reasonable time, visitors are encouraged to visit between 9:00 a.m. 
and 9:00 p.m. 
(d) Although visits generally have a therapeutic effect for clients. some 
visits may adversely affect or harm a client. Accordingly, the division may limit 
visitation in accordance with these rules. 
He-M 802.04 Visiting Procedures. 
(a) Any person may request authorization to visit a client from the client 
or administrator. 
(b) All visitors to Laconia state school must report to the front desk in the 
administration building prior to visiting any client or staff member. 
(c) The administrator or his designee may obtain the following 
information: 
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1. the name and address of the visitor; 
2. the name of the client; 
3. the relationship, if any, between the visitor and the client; and 
4. the reason for the requested visit. 
(e) The visitor must also report to the program coordinator or his desig­
nee at the residential building. 
He-M 802.05 Visits authorized by a client. 
(a) Except as provided in (c) below, a client who is 18 years of age or 
older and who does not have a guardian may authorize any person to visit him. 
(b) Except as provided in (c) below, any client 18 years of age or older 
who does not have a guardian may refuse to receive any visitor. 
(c) If an appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body has recom­
mended that guardianship proceedings be instituted for a client, the visitor must 
apply to the administrator as provided in He-M 802.07. 
(d) The administrator or his designee shall not prevent visits authorized 
in (a) above unless he believes that the visit will adversely affect the client. 
He-M 802.06 Visits authorized by guardians and certai" parents. 
(a) The guardian of a client may visit the client and authorize any person 
to visit the client. 
(b) A parent of a client under the age of 18 may visit the client and may 
authorize any person to visit the client. 
(c) A guardian of a client and the parent of a client under the age of 18 
may limit visitors to such clients by notifying the administrator of such limita­
tions in writing. 
(d) If the parent or guardian in (c) above has not expressly limited visita­
tion, the administrator may allow visits using the procedures in He-M 802.07. 
(e) The administrator shall not prevent visits authorized under (a) or (b) 
above unless he believes that the visit may adversely affect the client. 
He-M 802.08 Visits and visitors authorized as the result 0/a court order. If 
a particular visit or visitor is expressly authorized by the order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, the visit shall be allowed in accordance with the re­
quirements of the order. If the order sets no specific requirements on the visit 
or visitors, the administrator shall allow the visit in accordance with procedures 
set forth at He-M 802.04. 
He-M 802.09 Determination by program coordinator. 
(a) A program coordinator who determines that visits or certain visitors 
would adversely affect a client shall so notify the administrator in writing. 
(b) The administrator shall investigate the determination. If he concurs, 
he shall determine what limits on visiting are necessary. He shall then notify 
the following people of his decision: 
1. the client, 
2. the guardian of the client, if any, 
3. the parent of a client under the age of 18, if any, 
4. the court appointed attorney for the client, if any, and 
5. the representative of the client, if any. 
6. the program coordinator. 
He-M 802.10 Appeal Procedure. Individuals aggrieved by the operation of 
these rules may appeal using the complaint procedure at Laconia state school. 
He-M 802.11 Access to records. Rules governing access to records at Laco­
nia state school are contained at He-M 803. 
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PART He-M 803 ACCESS TO RECORDS ATLACONIA STATE SCHOOL 
He-M 803.01 Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to outline the policy 
and procedures for access to client records at Laconia state school. 
He-M 803.02 Definitions. The words and phrases used in this section shall 
mean the following, except where a different meaning is specified or clearly 
intended from the context. The masculine form includes the feminine. 
(a) "Appropriately Constituted Interdisciplinary Body" means a team in­
cluding at least a program coordinator or case manager and a psychologist. 
This team may include other retardation professionals and other persons con­
cerned with the welfare of the client. 
(b) "Case Manager" means 'a staff person under contract with the divi­
sion who is responsibie for individual serviCe planning and placement proce­
dures in the community. 
(c) "Client" means a person who resides at and receives services from 
Laconia state school. 
(d) "Guardian"means a guardian of the person or a temporary guardian 
of the person, appoiDted under RSA 464-A. 
(e) "Human Rights Committee" means a committee established under 
RSA 171-A:17. 
(f) "Individual Service Plan" means the plan for a client's habilitation 
and treatment defined in RSA 171-A:2, X 
(g) "Laconia State 'School" means the Laconia state school and training 
center in Laconia, New Hampshire. . 
(h)' "Parent" means a natural or adoptive parent whose parental rights 
have not been terminated or limited by judicial decree. 
(i) "Records" means all records .of a client relating to treatment, training 
and habilitation. 
OJ "Representative" means an individual who is in a position to safe­
guard the client's interests and who has been designated the client's representa­
tive under RSA l71-A:2, XV-b. 
(k) "Service Delivery System" means the comprehensive array of serv­
ices, including programs, residences and treatment defined in RSA 171-A:2, 
XVI. ' 
(I) "Service Plan Team" means a group of individuals, including a case 
manager, representing both a community program and Laconia state school, 
who are responsible for holding client-centered conferences to construct the in­
dividual's service plan. For the purposes of these rules, community program 
shall include other state agencies involved in the construction of the client's 
service plan. 
(m) "Superintendent" means the superintendent ofLaconia state school 
or his designee. 
He-M 803.03 Policy. 
(a) All records regarding a particular client are the property of Laconia 
state school. 
(b) These records are confidential and access to them may not be author­
ized except in accordance with the procedures set forth in these rules. 
(c) These rules do not apply to information which does not identify the 
client. 
He-M 803.04 Access to Records hy clients. All clients shall have access to 
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their own records except clients under the age of 18 and clients who have a 
guardian. 
He-M 803.05 Access to Records by Guardians and Certain Parents. 
(a) A guardian of a client shall have access to the records of the client. 
(b) Parents of a client under the age of 18 shall have access to the records 
of the client. 
He-M 803.06 Access to Records by a Representative. An individual who 
has been designated under RSA l71-A:2, as the representative ofa client shall 
have access to the records of the client. 
He-M 803.07 Access to Records Under a Wrillen Authorization. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a person who has access to 
records under section 803.04, section 803.05 or section 803.06 may grant access 
to all or pan of such records to another person by signing a release of informa­
tion form. 
(b) The release of information form shall state: 
I. 	 The name of the client; 
2. 	 The name of the person authorizing release; 
3. 	 The name of the person or agency to whom the information 
is to be released; 
4. 	 The specific information to be released; 
5. 	 The purpose for which the information is to be released; 
6. 	 The length of time for which the authorization is valid; and 
7. 	 A statement by the receiver acknowledging the responsibility 
to- maintain the confidentiality of the information released. 
The receiver shall also acknowledge the responsibility to use 
the information only for the purpose for which it was 
released. 
(c) Where an appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body has recom­
mended that guardianship proceedings be instituted for a client, the superinten­
dent shall review any written authorization. If the superintendent believes that 
release of the information will have an adverse effect on the client, the superin­
tendent may deny access. The client may appeal the denial to the human rights 
committee. 
He-M 803.08 Access to Records by Authorized Review Organization and 
Third Parry Payors. The superintendent shall authorize access to client records 
by individuals or organizations who are mandated by law, regulation or rule to 
inspect records. If access is authorized, the superintendent shall notify the indi­
vidual with authority to grant access under 803.07 that access has been granted. 
He-M 803.09 Access to Records by Professionals on the Service Plan Team. 
The superintendent may authorize access to records by professionals on the 
service plan team who need the information in order to complete the individual 
service plan. When access has been granted, the superintendent shall notify the 
person authorized to grant access under He-M 803.07. 
He-M 803.10 Access to Records by Certain Allorneys. An attorney who has 
been appointed by a coun to represent the legal interests of a client shall have 
access to the records of the client. 
He-M 803.11 Procedures for Examining Records. 
(a) Persons who have access or who have been granted access to records 
may examine the records only between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. 
Monday through Friday. Records shall not be examined on holidays. 
(b) Each person wishing to examine records shall provide evidence of his 
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whom DDAC seeks to represent."19 Thus, in July, 1981, DDAC 
filed suit in the same court that heard Garrity, challenging the regu­
lations and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief affirming their 
right to have access to residents at LSS.20 Joining the suit were four 
residents of LSS suing through their next friend. 21 The individual 
plaintiffs sued' on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons 
similarly situated.22 
On September 2, 1981, after a day-long hearing, Chief Judge 
Devine, the same judge who heard Garrity, dismissed DDAC.23 
Judge Devine found that neither DDAC nor the individually named 
plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring the action.24 As to plain­
tiffs' statutory claims, the court found that neither the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 nor the DO Act granted a cause of action to DDAC or to 
the individual plaintiffs.2s Nor would the court recognize a cause of 
action based upon New Hampshire statutory law.26 Regarding the 
first and fourteenth amendment claims27 raised by the plaintiffs, the 
court held that "[r]eview of the spate of overblown rhetoric advanced 
authority to examine the records. In addition the person must sign a log book 
stating his name, the name of the client, and his relationship to the dient. 
(c) Access shall be denied to any person who does not comply with the 
provisions of (b) above. 
(d) Records shall be examined only at a location designated by the super­
intendent and shall not be removed from such location without prior approval 
of the superintendent. 
(e) Each person who has access to records under sections 803.07, 803.08. 
803.09, or 803.10 shall agree in writing to preserve the confidentiality of such 
records and to assume all liability for disclosure of such records. 
(f)' Ponions of the records may be copied only at Laconia state school, 
provided the person requesting the copying pays the fee for such copying in 
advance. 
New Hampshire Div. of Mental Health and Developmental Servs. Regulations (Draft. 
Dec. 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Regulations), quoted in Brief of Appellants at 
297-306a, DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of 
Appellants). 
19. 521 F. Supp. at 367. 

20, Brief of Appellants at I 68-70a, supra note 18. 

21. 521 F. Supp. at 366. ' ' 
22. Brief of Appellants at 148a, supra note 18. The class consists of: 
All developmentally disabled persons who reside at, or are on the rolls of. 
Laconia State School and who need or will need or who seek or will seek mean­
ingful access to, communication, with, or the services of an attorney, the 
Developmena1 [sic) Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc., or their agents or 
employees. 
23. 521 F. Supp. at 372. 
24. Id 
25. Id at 369. 
26. Id 
27. See Brief of Appellants at 145a, supra note 18. 
544 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:537 
both orally and in writing in the course of this litigation might lead 
one to believe that the associational rights under the First and the 
right of access to courts under the Fourteenth Amendments are 
somehow implicated. They are not."28 
On September 22, 1982, in Developmental Disabilities Advocacy 
Center v. Melton ,29 the First Circuit vacated the judgment as to 
DDAC and remanded the case to the district court.30 While the 
original complaint was grounded in both statutory and constitutional 
issues,31 on appeal, the DDAC pressed only its first amendment 
claim.32 Expressing no view on the merits, the First Circuit held that 
as a nonprofit legal advocacy group, DDAC had standing to assert 
its first amendment rights of association to have access to the very 
group it was created to serve.33 
The author of this note submits that, on remand, the district 
court should grant the relief requested by plaintiffs. The need for 
independent, meaningful advocacy services has been given legisla­
tive approvaP4 as a result of a clear consensus of commentators that 
such a need exists.3S It will be shown that the regulations as promul­
gated by the State of New Hampshire make these services meaning­
less by restricting certain attorneys' access to both the residents of 
LSS and to their records.36 
The basis for such a finding, however, need not rest on first 
amendment grounds alone: "The federal courts have long been di­
rected to decide whether causes of action can be supported on statu­
tory grounds before they adjudicate constitutional law issues."37 It 
will be demonstrated that plaintiffs have a cause of action under sec­
tion 6012 of the DD Act,38 given the manner in which the act was 
28. 521 F. Supp. at 368. 
29. 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982). 
30. Id at 288. The First Circuit did, however, affirm the judgment as to the indio 
vidually named plaintiffs. It agreed with the lower coun's decision that Freda Smith, the 
next friend, did not have standing to sue on behalf of the named plaintiffs. Id at 284. 
3J. 521 F. Supp. at 367. 
32. 689 F.2d at 282 n.3. 
33. Id at 287; see id at 287-88 for a discussion of the history of non-profit legal 
advocacy organizations' rights under the first amendment. 
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6012 (West Supp. 1978-81). See infra notes 45-59 and accompa­
nying text. 
35. See infra notes 48, 108-28 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text. 
37. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 94 (3d Cir. 
1979), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. I (1982), on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.). cerro 
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528. 543 (1974); Siler 
V. Louisville &Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). 
38. See infra note 57; see also infro notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
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construed by the district court in Garrity.39 A resolution of the issues 
in DDAC based on the DD Act would comport with the general 
theory that constitutional issues should not be the basis of a decision 
if there is an applicable statutory ground. Furthermore, in Pennhursl 
Slale School and Hospitarv. Halderman,4O the DD Act lost a great 
deal of its potential power to provide individuals with developmen­
tal disabilities with an avenue to protect their rights.41 If the plain­
tiffs in DDAC can be successful in assert~g a claim under the DD 
Act, within the limitations imposed by the court in Garrity,42 this 
important piece of legislation may once again become more than 
"politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language about 
what the developmentally disabled deserve at the hands of state and 
federal authorities."43 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill ofRighls Act 
Perhaps, as Dostoyevsky said . . . the measure of a society's de­
gree of civilization is to be found in the care it affords its most 
disabled members. Unfortunately, custodial approaches to the . 
needs of the retarded . . . cannot be expected to be eliminated 
instantaneously or effortlessly. But the era of human warehouses, 
at least for the retarded, is hopefully drawing to a close. Legal 
activity is apparently hastening that end. Too many retarded per­
sons have needlessly endured lives of suffering, waste and oblivion 
for society to tolerate any other outcome. 
Our present laws, scientific knowledge, and sense of con­
science compel us to reexamine a system which has often chosen 
to incarcerate rather than habilitate. Toward that objective the 
advocates of the retarded seek to give voice to the pains of the 
silent, and to make possible lives of dignity and productiveness for 
39. 522 F. Supp. at 195-205; see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
40. 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 
2956 (1982). 
41. Id. at 11 (holding that section 6010 does not create substantive rights). See 
Ferleger, Rights and Dignity: Congress, The Supreme Court, and People with Disabilities 
After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 327 (1983); Comment, United States-Mental 
Health-The "Bill ojRights" ojthe Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill ofRights 
Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights jor the Mentally Retarded to Appropriate Treatment 
in the Least Restrictive Environment. 58 N.D.L. REV. 119, 131 (1982); Note, Pennhurst v. 
Halderman: A Bill ojRights in Name Only, 13 U. TaL. L. REV. 214,232 (1981). 
42. 522 F. Supp. at 205; see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
43. 451 U.S. at 32 (B1ackmun, J., concurring in pan). 
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the humble.44 
The measure of this society's degree of civilization in regard to 
persons with retardation can be found in the Developmentally Dis­
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975.45 The bill, as it was 
enacted in 1975, was an outgrowth of the Mental Retardation Facili­
ties and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 
1963.46 The Act was expanded in 1970 to cover all developmental 
disabilities,47 and, in the wake of further congressional awareness of 
the plight of the developmentally disabled, the Bill of Rights section 
(section 6010) of the DD Act was passed in 1975.48 
The bill, as promulgated by the Senate, contained a comprehen­
sive and highly detailed list of rights to be accorded the developmen­
tally disabled.49 Although the House agreed "that for the vast 
majority of individuals institutional care is inappropriate and inhu­
44. Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights ofthe 
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995, 1026 (1972). . 
45. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81). 
46. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282. See H.R. REP. No. 58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 919, 920 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 
No. 58}. 
47. Developmental Disabilities Service and Facilities Construction Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-517,84 Stat. 1316. 
48. 121 CONGo REC. 29,309 (1975) (House); id at 29,317 (Senate). Testimony was 
heard by Congress which dramatized the plight of the developmentally disabled. Dr. 
Roben Cook summarized their plight by stating that, "[t}he institutionalized mentally 
retarded are the most neglected of all persons in our society. They have been subjected 
to ethical and legal abuses, with loss of rights, both civil and personal, frequently occur­
ing without even a semblance of due process." S. REP. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. l6O}. 
The conclusions reached by the Senate were finn and clear: 
The Committee is firmly convinced that Congress must take action to ensure 
the humane care, treatment, habilitation, and protection of mentally retarded 
and other persons with developmental disabilities. The Federal Government 
has the responsibility to provide equal protection under the law to all citizens. 
Expens in the field of developmental disabilities as well as in civil rights 
law now agree that every effon should be made to insure that our developmen­
tally disabled citizens are provided every opponunity of being cared for in the 
least restrictive setting that is consistent with the person's ability for self-care. 
Therefore, the intent of this legislation is not only to improve care in resi­
dential facilities, but also to minimize inappropriate admissions and to stimu­
late the States to develop alternative programs of care for mentally retarded 
and other developmentally disabled persons. 
Id at 32-33. 
49. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 42. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 961. 
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mane,"50 it did not agree that a comprehensive listing of "rights" was 
necessary to achieve the goal of deinstitutionalization.51 The com­
promise achieved included a list of "Congressional findings respect­
ing rights of developmentally disabled."52 
Congress was concerned, not only with establishing rights for 
50. H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 37, at 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 933. 
51. "Plans for the elimination of inappropriate placement in institutions ... 
should generally include plans for preventing such inappropriate placement in the first 
place ...." Id., supra note 46, at 17, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
935. 
52. 	 42 U.S.c.A. § 6010 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81). 
§ 6010. Congressional findings respecting rights of developmentally 
disabled 
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with 
developmental disabilities: 
(I) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate 
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities. 
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with develop­
mental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential 
of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the 
persons' personal liberty. 
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to 
assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residen­
tial program for persons with developmental disabilities that­
(A) does not prqvide treatment, services, and habilitation which is 
appropriate to the needs of such persons; or 
(8) does not meet the following minimum standards: 
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the 
persons with developmental disabilities being served by the program. 
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient med­
ical and dental services. 
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such persons 
unless absolutely necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint 
as a punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program. 
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on 
such persons and the use of such restraints as punishment or as a sub­
stitute for a habilitation program or in quantities that interfere with 
services, treatment, or habilitation for such persons. 
(v) Pennission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at 
reasonable hours without prior notice. 
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may 
be promulgated by the Secretary. 
(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should meet 
standards which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for 
those served, and­
(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of 
comprehensive health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services, which 
are at least equivalent to those standards applicable to intennediate care 
facilities for the mentally retarded promulgated in regulations of the Secre­
tary on January 17, 1974 (39 Fed.Reg. pI. 1I), as appropriate when taking 
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persons with developmental disabilities, but also in seeing that those 
rights would be enforced.s3 The House Committee was "well aware 
that ... disabled and handicapped citizens are often unreasonably 
and unnecessarily deprived of their rights and relegated to second 
class status."54 Given the understanding of this situation in 1970, 
one of the three major areas of emphasis for projects funded by the 
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1970 was legal and personal advo­
cacy for the disabled. 55 
The Senate report on the 1975 bill was clear and unequivocal on 
the need for an independent protection and advocacy agency to pro­
tect the human and legal rights of the developmentally disabled.56 
The final version of the bill thus included the requirement of a state 
system of protection and advocacy.s7 The committee compromise 
into account the size of the institutions and the service delivery arrange­
ments of the facilities of the programs; 
(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with devel­
opmental disabilities, which assure that care is appropriate to the needs of 
the persons being served by such programs, assure that the persons admit­
ted to facilities of such programs are persons whose needs can be met 
through services provided by such facilities, and assure that the facilities 
under such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the 
facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and 
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care 
provided by such programs is appropriate to the persons served by the 
programs. 
The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in findings 
made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights other­
wise afforded to all persons. 
fri. 
53. These rights are generally included in the conference substitute in rec­
ognition by the conferees that the developmentally disabled, particularly those 
who have the misfortune,to require institutionalization, have a right to receive 
appropriate treatment for the conditions for which they are institutionalized, 
and Ihallhis righl should beprolecledand assured by Ihe Congress and Ihe courts. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.& 
AD. NEWS 961 (emphasis added). 
54. H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 46, at 7, reprinled in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 925. 
55. fri., supra note 46, at 6, reprinled in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 924. 
56. S. REp. No. 160, supra note 48, at 37. 
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6012 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81). 
§ 6012. Protection and advocacy of individual rights; reports; State allot­
ments and reallotments; ratio; authorization of appropriations 
(a) In order for a State to receive an allotment under subchapter III of 
this chapter, (I) the State must have in effect a system to protect and advocate 
the rights of persons with developmental disabilities, (2) such system must 
(A) have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate 
remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such persons who are receiving 
treatment, services, or habilitation within the State, (B) not be administered by 
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stated clearly that "the Federal government and the States have an 
obligation to assure that public funds are not provided in programs 
which do not provide appropriate treatment, services and habilita­
tion or do not meet minimum standards respecting . . . visiting 
hours."58 The Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc., is 
such a protection and advocacy agency, established by the State of 
New Hampshire pursuant to section 6012.59 
The question then becomes how the DD Act functions to pro­
tect the rights of the developmentally disabled. It is on this question 
t.hat much of the litigation on the DD Act focuses. The first case to 
construe the Bill of Rights section of the D D Act was United States v. 
the State Planning Council, and (C) be independent of any agency which pro­
vides treatment. services, or habilitation to persons with developmental disabili­
ties, and (3) the State must submit to the Secretary in a form prescribed by the 
Secretary in regulations (A) a repon, not less often than once every three years, 
describing the system, and (8) an annual repon describing the activities carried 
out under the system and any changes made in the system during the previous 
year. 
(b)( I )(A) To assist States in meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of 
this section, the Secretary shall allot to the States the sums appropriated under 
paragraph (2). Allotments and reallotments of such sums shall be made on the 
same basis as the allotments and reallotments are made under the first sentence 
of subsections (a)(I) and (d) of section 6062 of this title, except that no State 
(other than Guam, the Nortllem Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the Virgin 
Islands. and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) in any fiscal year shall be 
allotted an amount under this subparagraph which is less than the greater of 
$50.000 or the amount of the allotment to the State under this paragraph for the 
previous fiscal year. 
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), if the aggregate of the amounts 
of the allotments for grants to be made in accordance with such subparagraph 
for any fiscal year exceeds the total of the amounts appropriated for such allot­
ments under paragraph (2), the amount of a State's allotment for such fiscal 
year shall bear the same ratio to the amount otherwise determined under such 
subparagraph as the total of the amounts appropriated for that year under para­
graph (2) bears to the aggregate amount required to make an allotment to each 
of the States in accordance with subparagraph (A). 
(2) For allotments under paragraph (I), there are authorized to be appro­
priated $3,000,000 for fiscal year 1976, $3,000,000 for fiscal year 1977, 
$3.000,000 for fiscal year 1978, $9,000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 1979, $12,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, $15,000,000 
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 198 I. $8,000,000 for the fiscal year 
ending September 30. 1982, $8.000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1983. and $8,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984. The provi­
sions of section 1913 of Title 18 shall be applicable to all moneys authorized 
under the provisions of this section. 
Id 
58. H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 46. at 42. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 961. 
59. 521 F. Supp. at 366; 689 F.2d at 282 n.l, 287. 
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Solomon,6o where the court denied standing to the United States to 
bring a suit to enjoin state mental health policies.61 The Solomon 
court construed the statute to provide "a statement of minimum 
objectives and standards for ... treatment, services and habilitation 
which is made binding both on the federal government and the 
states."62 The court further held that the DD Act provided a funding 
mechanism to a state "if the state submits a plan complying with the 
statutory and administrative requirements set forth in [sections16011 
and 6012."63 The court thus effectively held compliance with section 
6012 to be a condition precedent for funding.64 
The first case to hold that the Bill of Rights sections ofthe DD 
Act provides for a private cause of action was Naughton v. Bevilac­
qua .65 Holding that the DD Act created a statutory right to appro­
priate treatment,66 the court went on to state that "[t]he legislative 
scheme and history indicate that Congress intended this statutory 
right to be enforceable through individual private actions in the judi­
cial [forum] ...."67 Although the court noted that the DD Act is a 
funding statute, it scrutinized section 6012 and the requirement of an 
independent protection and advocacy agency to protect the rights of 
persons with developmental disabilities. The court reasoned that the 
enforcement of individual rights cannot be achieved by the act of 
simply withholding federal moneys, and that "the advocacy agency 
and a private right of action are crucial to protect the rights secured 
by the Act."68 
A case that more directly focused on section 6012 was Goldstein 
v. Coughlin .69 In that case, brought by the protection and advocacy 
agency, the judge held that the agency need show no injury to itself 
to have standing.70 The reason was based upon the congressional 
requirement as set forth in section 6012, to provide legal representa­
tion to persons with developmental disabilities and to cast this re­
sponsibility on the state protection and advocacy agency. 71 
60. 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977). 
61. ld at 1123. Bur see 42 U.S.C.A. 1997a (West 1981) which now permits the 
United States to bring such an action. 
62. 563 F.2d at 1124. 
63. ld at 1125 (emphasis added). See 42 U.S.c. § 6063 (Supp. IV 1980). 
64. 563 F.2d at 1125. 
65. 458 F. Supp. 610 (D. R.I. 1978). offd. 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979). 
66. ld at 613. 
67. ld at 616. 
68. ld (footnote omitted). 
69. 83 F.R.D. 613 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
70. ld at 614 (citing Naughton v. Bevilacqua. 458 F. Supp. at 616 n.3). 
71. 83 F.R.D. at 614. 
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The United States was again denied standing to bring an action 
under the DD Act in United States v. Mallson. 72 The court held that 
as the DD Act is a funding mechanism, with a built-in state protec­
tion system in the protection and advocacy system under section 
6012, the legislature did not contemplate federal enforcement of the 
DD Act.73 The court in Malison adopted the reasoning set forth two 
years earlier in Solomon .74 . 
The United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in 
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,7S provides the 
most comprehensive discussion of the DD Act to date.76 The deci­
sion, however, was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court.77 The 
Court held that section 6010 did not create the substantive rights 
upon which the Third Circuit granted relief.78 The Third Circuit's 
rationale, however, remains important. If future actions are brought 
under the DD Act using the Garrity interpretation of rights79 the 
thorough analysis of the court of appeals in Pennhurst, where, as 
contrasted to the Supreme Court decision, the court actually reached 
the merits,80 provides important guidance. 
Finding that conditions at the Pennhurst State School violated 
the DD Act, the court of appeals in Pennhurst affirmed the lower 
court's finding of violations, but based its decision on statutory 
grounds rather than on the constitutional grounds cited by the dis­
trict court.81 
[The Act] established particular rights and benefits for the devel­
opmentally disabled. . . . In addition. . . the Act expressly pro­
vided that the developmentally disabled have a right to treatment 
or habilitation. In the so-called Bill of Rights section . . . Con­
gress made plain Its intention to establish a right to treatment 
.... It is hard to see how Congress could have been any more 
precise in revealing its intention to confer a right to treatment or 
habilitation.82 
72. 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979). 
73. Id. at 1299. 
74. Id. at J:~97. 
75. 612 F.2d 84, rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 645 
(3d Cir.), em. gran/ed, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). . 
76. Id. at 95-97. 
77. 451 U.S. at 5. 
78. Id. at 18; see infra text accompanying note 91. 
79. See infra notes \03-05 and accompanying text. 
80. 612 F.2d at 92-116. 
81. Id. at 89, 95. 
82. 612 F.2d at 95-96; see infra text accompanying notes 96-97 for discussion as to 
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The Third Circuit analyzed the funding mechanism of the stat­
ute83 and reasoned that as a state must submit a plan for approval by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services before receiving any 
federal funds, and that as the plan must meet certain requirements, 
including assurances that the human rights of all persons with devel­
opmental disabilities will be protected consistent with section 6010, 
that this amounted to a statutory right to treatment for persons with 
mental retardation that is enforceable by a private right of action.84 
One case following the court of appeals' decision in Pennhurst 
held that the 00 Act granted substantive rights to individual plain­
tiffs who were the beneficiaries of federal funds via participation in 
state programs.8S Medley v. Ginsberg86 rejected a requirement that 
plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies.87 The coUrt held that 
there is no requirement in section 6012 of the 00 Act that plaintiffs 
pursue any administrative remedies and that the section is a "condi­
tion precedent to the receipt of Federal funds."88 Two subsequent 
cases held that nothing in the language of the Act or in the case law 
would prevent a plaintiff from seeking a private right. 89 
The Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman ,90 however, dealt a severe blow to plaintiffs pursuing pri­
vate causes of action under the DO Act. In an opinion by Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court reversed the third circuit's decision and held 
that the Bill of Rights section of the DO Act created no substantive 
rights to be enforced by individual plaintiffs.91 
The Supreme Court construed the DO Act as a "federal-state 
program whereby the Federal Government provides financial assist­
ance to participating States to aid them in creating programs to care 
for and treat the developmentally disabled."92 The Court held that 
how the Supreme Coun differed with the Third Circuit's interpretation of the legislative 
history of the Bill of Rights section. 
83. 42 U.S.c. § 6063 (Supp. IV 1980). 
84. 612 F.2d at 96-97. As the coun found the statute to include an implied right of 
action, it thus found it necessary to apply the analysis outlined in Con v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66 (1975), to determine whether the right is enforceable by these plaintiffs. 612 F.2d at 
97-98. The coun determined that the plaintiffs fulfilled the Cort criteria. Id 
85. Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.W. Va. 1980). 
86. 492 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. W. Va. 1980). 
87. Id 
88. Id (citing Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d at 97). 
89. See, e.g., lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1278 (D. Conn. 1981); Henkin v. 
South Dakota Dep't of Social Servs., 498 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.S.D. 1980). 
90. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
91. Id at 18; see supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
92. 451 U.S. at II. 
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states need comply with the conditions of the DD Act only if they 
opt to participate in the program.93 Construing the overall purpose 
of the DO Act as financial assistance to participating state.s,94 the 
Court determined that the issue to be resolved was whether compli­
ance with the Bill of Rights section is a condition precedent to re­
ceipt of this assistance, and thus whether substantive rights are 
created which can be enforced by a private right of action.95 
The Court engaged in a comprehensive analysis of section 6010. 
A plain reading of the statute, according to Justice Rehnquist, 
showed that "[n]oticably absent from [section] 6010 is any language 
suggesting that [section] 6010 is a 'condition' for the receipt of fed­
eral funding. . . ."96 Justice Rehnquist then interpreted the legisla­
tive history to show. that Congress had only modest and vague 
intentions for this section.97 
Section 6012 clearly was distinguished98 from the general, non­
binding interpretation given section 6010.99 While the Court found 
that section 6010 merely suggests a preference for certain kinds of 
treatment,100 section 6012 "conditions aid on a State's promise to 
'have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons 
with developmental disabilities.' "101 In DDAC then, the issue be­
comes whether the regulations restricting visitation to residents ham­
per DDAC's ability to fulfill its statutory mandate to provide 
advocacy services. 102 
Garrity was in accord with Pennhurst that section 6012 condi­
93. Id. The Court also stated that although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
elected to participate in the program, Pennhurst itself received no federal funds under the 
DD Act. id. at 11, 28. 
94. 451 U.S. at 11-12,22; see 42 U.s.C. § 6000(b)(I) (Supp. IV 1980). 
9S. 4S1 U.S. at 10-11. The Court was also concerned with whether the DD Act 
was enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under its spending power or section S of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. at IS. The Court held, that as Congress did not explicitly 
state that it was acting pursuant to section S o~ the fourteenth amendment, and that since 
the DD Act functions in the nature of a contract, the states cannot be expected to accept 
conditions not explicitly stated. Id. at 16-18. 
96. Id. at 13. 
97. The opinion is peppered with italicized words to prove his point. Id. at 21. But 
see id. at 32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). "It seems plain to me that Congress, in 
enacting § 6010, intended to do more than merely set out politically self-serving but es­
sentially meaningless language about what the developmentally disabled deserve at the 
hands of state and federal authorities." Id. 
98. Id. at 13. 
99. Id. at 19;see Note, Pennhurst v. Halderman: A Bill 0/Rights in Name Only, 13 
U. TOL L. REV. 214, 214 (1981). 
100. 4S1 U.S. at 19. 
101. Id. at 13. 
102. See infra text accompanying notes IS8-67. 
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tions aid on a state's guarantee that it have in effect a protection and 
advocacy system. 103 Judge Devine, who was soon to hear DDAC, 
distinguished Garrity from Pennhurst and found that the DD Act did 
create a limited private right of action. 104 Even though the DD Act 
primarily benefits the states by providing funds, it also benefits the 
developmentally disabled. As the state cannot receive assistance un­
less the Secretary of Health and Human Services approves the state's 
plan, "it can be implied from the Act that a developmentally dis­
abled person has a limited right to assure that the Secretary . . . 
performs his statutory duty in enforcing the Act." lOS 
It is clear then, that in DDA C plaintiffs can address their griev­
ance through the DD Act if they amend their complaint to include 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. lU6 The Supreme Court 
in Pennhurst clearly distinguished section 6012 from its holding,107 
and the district court that will hear DDA C on remand expressly al­
lows such actions. The analysis must then tum to a review of the 
need for meaningful access to clients and the impact of the New 
Hampshire regulations, to determine the success of such an action. 
B. Need/or Access 
Plaintiffs in Pennhurst and residents of LSS share one striking 
similarity. The institutions in which they reside are old, in remote, 
inaccessible locations, and are designed to separate persons with re­
tardation from the mainstream population. lOS This isolation, and 
103. 522 F. Supp.at 198. 
104. Id at 199-202. One manner in which Garril)' may be distinguished from Pen· 
nhurst is that the Supreme Coun suggested that the Pennhurst school was not a program 
assisted under the DD Act. Id at 199; 451 U.S. at 28; see supra note 93. Judge Devine in 
Garrity, analyzed a post-Pennhursl decision and concluded that he, as the Third Circuit 
had inPennhursl,seesupra note 69, must also apply the Con v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), 
test that the Supreme Coun In Pennhursl declined to apply. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. 
Supp. at 200. By applying this test, the Garrity coun decided that a limited private right 
of action did exist. Id at 20 I. 
105. Id at 201; see supra note 63. In Garrity, the coun held that as New Hamp­
shire was receiving funds under the Bill of Rights Act, the Secretary had thus implicitly 
or explicitly approved of the state plan and thus the state was in compliance. The coun 
suggested that the Secretary be made a pany to the action if the plaintiffs wished to allege 
that he had failed to comply with the statute. 522 F. Supp. at 203. 
106. FED. R. CIY. P. 15(a) allows for the amendment of a complaint at the discre­
tion of the coun. 
107. See supra notes 100-01; see also 451 U.S. at 50 (White, J.• dissenting). "[I]t 
seems rather plain that [section 6012] contemplates not only ongoing oversight by the 
Secretary but also enforcement of the rights of persons receiving treatment through judi­
cial action or otherwise." Id 
108. Brief of Amici Curiae at 7, Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman. 
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the stigma associated with institutionalized persons with retardation, 
results in a powerlessness and vulnerability,l°9 Given this situation, 
it becomes clear that "[p]erhaps no identifiable group needs legal 
services as desperately as retarded people." 110 Persons with retarda­
tion, however, are an under-represented group of people. I I I 
Many rights of this under-represented group are often effected 
by their status. 112 Even though persons with retardation do have 
rights,1I3 they are not "self-executory" and require dedicated advo­
451 U.S. I (1981). on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.). cerl. granted. 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Amici Curiae). In DDA C the district court took judicial 
notice of the fact that LSS is isolated from the community. Brief of Appellants at 76a. 
supra note 18. 
109. Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 679. 
690-91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Herr, CiVIl Rights). 
110. Herr, The New Clients. supra note 10, at 583. 
III. S. HERR, ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES: REPORT TO 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MONITORS ON ADVOCACY NEEDS AND MODELS 
FOR MASS...CHUSETTS CLASS CLIENTS 99 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HERR REPORT): 
Schwanz, Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mental(v Disabled Persons: Models 
for Institutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY PROGRAM: REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH HANDICAPS 
183. 219 (S. Schwanz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as S. 
Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger). Note, The New York Mental Health Informalion 
Service: A New Approach to Hosplialization ofthe Mentall)' III, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 672. 
672 (1967). 
112. Brief of Amici Curiae at 13, supra note \08. 
113. 	 451 U.S. at 27: Herr, The New Clients. supra note 10. at 586. 
The issues of retarded persons' rights that deserve particularly close atten­
tion are: (I) challenging involuntary commitment of any person on grounds of 
mental retardation; (2) establishing II: system for automatic judicial or quasi­
judicial review of institutional commitments; (3) creating a network of less 
drastic alternatives to institutionalization. including home-based care with 
horne assistance; (4) ensuring effective counsel at all stages of commitment. 
including treatment or discharge; (5) providing friend-advocates, surrogate 
parents in education hearings, and other types of lay advocates; (6) creating 
and monitoring advocacy systems to ensure independent and vigorous legal ad­
vocacy; (7) protecting rights to refuse habilitation without retaliatory discharge: 
(8) securing damages and injunctive relief to halt abuse to brutality against resi­
dents; and (9) obtaining free habilitative services. 
Id See Dickey & Remington, Legal Assistance for Institutionalized Persons-An Over­
looked Need, 1976S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 176-77; Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hosplial 
Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 444 (1973): Schoenfeld, 
Human Rightsfor the Mentall)' Retarded' Their Recogmiion by the Providers 0/Service. 4 
HUM. RIGHTS 31 (1974); see also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st CiT. 1980). vacated 
and remanded sub nom .. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (case remanded to the 
Supreme Judicial Coun of Massachusetts in light of their decision in In re Richard Roe. 
421 N.E.2d 40 (1981». Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1966) (right to treat­
ment): Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (right to due process in 
civil commitment proceedings); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
orders entered, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental illness facilities). 344 F. 
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cates to ensure that they are protected. I 14 A naked right, without the 
mechanism for enforcement, is meaningless. I 15 The institutionalized 
person must, therefore, have access to an advocate to see that rights 
are enforced. 
To operate effectively, the advocate must be independent of 
outside restrictions. 116 The residents of institutions "need help in 
overcoming the barriers of inertia and an isolated environment 
••••"117 Without such independent advocacy services, these resi­
dents will be unable to assert their rights, including the right to dein­
stitutionalization. 118 The need for independent advocates is 
. demonstrated most clearly when the wishes of the client and the cli­
ent's guardian conflict. Although the courts have the power to ap­
point a substitute guardian if the actions of the guardian are contrary 
to the interests of the ward, the ward must have the support of a legal 
advocate to articulate the need for such action. As the law of incom­
petency does not assume an "identity of interest" between the guard­
ian and the ward, the law must then provide the ward· with the 
mechanism to assert his or her own interests. 1l9 
Not only are rights meaningless without enforcement mecha­
nisms, they are also meaningless if the institutionalized person must 
rely on the institution's staff to provide physical access to an attor­
ney. "Only a physically accessible advocacy office on the grounds of 
an institution will ensure that clients and their friends can obtain the 
assistance of qualified advocates." 120 The circumstances of institu-
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental retardation facilities), affd in part, rev'd and 
remanded in part sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). BUI see 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S: Ct. 2452 (1982) (limiting the right to treatment to minimally 
adequate or reasonable treatment). 
114. Brief of Appellants at 185a, supra note 18. 
115. HERR REPORT, supra note I H, at 11,63. See Herr, The New Clienls, supra 
note 10, at 571; Herr, Civil Righls, supra note 109, at 708. "Without adequate representa­
tion, the question of rights for residents assumes a hypothetical cast. . . . If they are to 
benefit fully from existing laws or proposed reforms, advocacy and representation for the 
retarded resident will be decisive." Id 
116.. HERR REPORT, supra note III. at 85. See supra notes 47-48 and accompany­
ing text. 
117. HERR REPORT, supra note III. at 81. 
118. Herr, Civil Righls, supra note 109, at 724. 
119. Id at 709 n.14O, 712-14; HERR REPORT, supra note III, at 89. See Mick­
enberg, The St1enl Clienls: Legal and Elhical Consideralions in Representing Severely and 
Profoundly Retarded Individuals. 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 629 (1979). 
120. HERR REPORT, supra note 111, at 72-73. See Herr. The New Clienls, supra 
note 	10, at 579-80. 

Such problems of 'access to counsel' are greatly magnified when the potential 

client is a retarded adult who resides in a mental institution. Lawyers rarely 

venture into the back wards of institutions in which the severely and pro­
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tionalized persons demand that legal advocacy services be available 
at the institution. The isolation of the institution makes it difficult 
for individuals to seek counsel on their own.121 Often individuals 
are unable to leave the grounds of the institution, or are even una­
ware that they have rights. 122 Thus, attorneys must go to the institu­
tion and seek out their clients. 123 As a leading commentator in this 
field states, "[a]dvocates must be able to visit wards and cottages at 
reasonable times and in a reasonable manner in order to perform 
such functions as visiting clients, giving information about client 
rights, and investigating actual or possible instances of neglect, 
abuse, or other rights violations."124 
While the presence of an on-site advocacy project may be re­
sisted by administrators and staff of an institution,125 often the end 
result is that the project comes to be viewed as a positive force for 
both the clients and the institution: 126 "As one Massachusetts insti­
foundly retarded are housed and the equivalents of jailhouse lawyers are simi­
larly rare. In some states, statutes and regulations oblige employees of the 
institution to assist residents in communiCating their complaints to outsiders. 
including lawyers. but institutional staff are clearly the wrong people on whom 
to cast this responsibility. In some cases staff people have subverted the legal 
process and prevented residents from securing counsel. 
Id. 
12 I. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Herr. The New Clients, 
supra note 70, at 577. "The present network of legal services for retarded people is fur­
ther limited by the location of the legal advocacy programs and the geographic isolation 
of prospective clients. The availability of legal assistance will often depend on where the 
client happens to live." fd. Further, "mentally retarded and mentally ill persons in insti­
tutions or in sheltered facilities are in no position to compete for scarce, publically 
funded neighborhood legal services." HERR REPORT, supra note Ill, at 39. 
122. Herr. The New Clients, supra note 10, at 596-97. 
123. "With the fall of old barriers to advertising and solicitation. mental disability 
lawyers providing free legal assistance through nonprofit agencies can advertise their 
services...." Id. . 
It was on this point that the First Circuit's decision in DDAC was based. "[I)t is now 
clear that such legal advocacy organizations have first amendment rights which, in ap­
propriate circumstances, may permit them to seek out clients and initiate litigation." 689 
F.2d at 287 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963». 
124. HERR REPORT, supra note III, at 77. "[A)dvocate must have unrestrained 
access to clients and the capacity to pursue the full range of legal, administrative and 
other remedies, including judicial recourse, on behalf of clients." Id. at 7. 
125. Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mentally Disabled Persons: Models 
jor Institutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in S. Schwatz, R. Fleischner & D. 
Ferleger.supra note III. at 221. 
126. The Mental Patients Advocacy Project (MPAP) at Northampton State Hospi­
tal represents their clients "aggressively. helping them to achieve their desired goals. 
often in the face of strong staff opposition .... Yet we are accepted as a valuable. if 
sometimes unpopular. component of the institution. We have even secured persuasive 
letters of support from hospital and Department [of Mental Health) officials for the con­
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tutional superintendent expressed it, 'I used to believe advocacy was 
the panacea for mental retardation and psychotropic drugs for 
mental illness. Now I'm not so sure about the drugs, but 1 do believe 
in advocacy for both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded.' "127 
The presence of the advocacy project increases the "ethical and pro­
fessionally responsible behavior of mental health personnel . . . . 
The concentration upon [clients'] rights is central to competent advo­
cacy and to insuring public scrutiny of those institutions which wield 
such enormous power over the lives of their clients."128 
Although there is a fair amount of literature stating that advo­
cacy services are essential to protect the rights of the institutional­
ized, the case law in this area is, as yet, largely undeveloped. 
Advocates for persons with developmental disabilities have had 
to resort to other areas of law, and to analogize their clients' situa­
tions to the available case law. Litigation concerning access to mi­
grant farm worker camps provides a close analogy to institutional 
law. 129 The camps, like the institutions, are frequently isolated from 
the general population. 130 Courts have often granted legal services 
attorneys access to these camps for the purpose of discussing condi­
tions or offering assistance}31 
The Supreme Court, in Procunier v. Martinez, 132 struck down, 
as an arbitrary distinction, California prison regulations that denied 
tinuation of our funding." Schwartz & Fleischner, Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined 
in Menial Hospilals: A ViewJi'om Ihe Inside, in S. Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger, 
supra note III, at 163, 175. 
The hospital. may even view the advocacy program as having therapeutic value. 
E.g., Lowry & Kennedy, Clinical Law in the Area ofMental Health, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 
373, 387 n.62. 
127. HERR REPORT, supra note lll, at 4. 
128. Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mentally Disabled Persons: Models 
for InSlilutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in S. Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. 
Ferleger, supra note III, at 232. 
129. Brief of Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. at 42, DDAC v. 
Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of DDAC). 
130.· Id at 42-43; see supra notes \08-09 and accompanying text. 
131. See Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Mid-Hud­
son Legal Services, Inc. v. G.&U., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Folgueras v. 
Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971). See also Brief of Amici Curiae at 25, 
DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982). Amici drew an analogy to Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 40 I U.S. 371 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that, due to the funda­
mental nature of marriage in this society, all individuals must have access to the judicial 
system to dissolve that relationship regardless of ability to pay court costs. fd at 374. By 
the same token, to deny institutionalized persons access to advocates, and thus to the 
courts due to tileir inability to seek out services, would be a denial of due process when 
important, and perhaps even fundamental rights are at stake. 
132. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
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law students employed by attorneys access to prisoners but allowed 
students in law school programs free access.133 The Court noted the 
isolation of the prisons, and the tremendous need for legal assist­
ance,134 clearly a situation analogous to LSS and its residents. 
The regulations at issue in DDA C create a similar arbitrary dis­
tinction by restricting non-court appointed attorneys access to resi­
dents while allowing court appointed attorneys free access. 135 This 
indicates an intent on the part of the administrators to limit the abil­
ity of residents to have access to counsel which violates section 6012 
of the DD Act. As New Hampshire receives funds under the Act,136 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services has violated his duty by 
approving a state plan that contains this· arbitrary distinction,I37 and 
thus is not in compliance with the law .. 
The earliest discovered case dealing directly with the develop­
mentally disabled was decided by one of the foremost champions of 
the rights of persons with disabilities, Judge Bazelon of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. In Thornton v. Corcoran, 138 
Judge Bazelon said that "[i]deally, there should be a specialized, ex­
perienced bar skilled in legal problems revolving about mental ill­
ness. There is not, however, and realistically there probably never 
will be such a legal cOrpS."I39 While there is now such a legal corps 
mandated by Congress,14O the issue is how to make it effective. 141 
This specialized bar brought suit in Pennsylvania and succeeded 
in winning a consent decree "to enjoin the defendant's allegedly un­
lawful and arbitrary policies and practices relating to the patients' 
rights to visit with, contact, get advice from and be provided services 
by community organizers, citizens and attorneys."142 Although not 
based on the DD Act,143 this case upholds a consent decree that pro­
vides that patients have the right to meet with representatives of 
133. Id. at 421. 
134. Id. at 420: see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
135. Draft Regulations, supra note 18, §§ He-M 802.03(b). 803.10. 
136. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. at 203: see supra note 105. 
137. 522 F. Supp. at 203; see supra note 87. 
138. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
139. Id. at 702. 
140. 42 U.S.c. § 6012 (Supp. IV 1980). 
141. HERR REPORT. supra note III, at 109. "The protection and advocacy pro­
gram mandated by Public Law 94-103 is the prime conduit for advocacy funding for 
developmentally disabled citizens." fd. at 108. 
142. Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project v. Hospital Staff Civil Rights Comm.. 
444 F. Supp. 981. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
143. The cause of action was based on constitutional grounds. Id 
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groups interested in protecting their civil rights. 144 
The issue of the need for meaningful advocacy services for insti­
tutionalized persons is not new to the First Circuit. 14s In 1978, in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a con­
sent decree was entered into in the case of Brewster v. Dukakis .146 
Plaintiff class of persons with mental disabilities at Northampton 
State Hospital brought suit against officials of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts claiming that their constitutional and statutory rights 
to be treated in "appropriate, less restrictive alternatives suitable to 
their needs" were being violated. 147 The decree entered by the court, 
and agreed to by all parties, sought to establish a system to formulate 
such alternatives, and jurisdiction was retained to enable any party 
to seek further orders if necessary.I48 There has been substantial 
litigation regarding the decree, including a case brought to enforce a 
clause relating to advocacy services. 149 "The [court appointed] Mon­
itor will investigate and determine the necessity for trained, in­
dependent advocates to assist clients in the protection of their rights 
•.••"150 The clause also set forth a requirement that the parties 
cooperate in investigating funding sources for an advocacy 
system.I SI 
The Monitor's report was unequivocal on the need for trained, 
paid, independent advocates lS2 and was based largely on the Herr 
Report. IS3 The court found that an important aspect of meaningful 
144. Id at 986. 
145. In one case, the First Circuit expressly upheld visitation regulations that pro­
vided for restricted access. In Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest 
Home, 667 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1981), the court held that the residents at the Rambling 
Rose Rest Home had adequate access to their attorneys given the requirement of flexible 
visiting hours and privacy during telephone conversations and visits as set forth in the 
regulations. Id at 241. Cape Cod can be easily distinguished from DDAC, as the court 
in Cape Cod based its decision on the fact that residents at the nursing home could have 
mail and telephone contact with their cOunsel. In DDAC the residents were not able to 
use the telephone or write letters, and were not aware of the need to do so to protect their 
rights. 
146. Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, slip op. (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1978) (consent 
decree). 
147. Id at 3. 
148. Id. at 3, 4. 
149. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882 (D. Mass 1981), vacated and remanded. 
687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982). 
150. Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, slip op. at 36 (D. Mass. Dec. 7. 1978) 
(consent decree). 
151. Id 
152. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882, 887, vacated and remanded. 687 F.2d 
495 (1st Cir. 1982). 
153. HERR REPORT, supra note Ill. 
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access includes "access to clients themselves and, with appropriate 
safeguards, client records." 154 The court found this need to be of 
such significance, that in order to prevent the potential loss of a pri­
vate advocacy project, the Commonwealth was ordered to fund the 
advocacy services}55 Although the First Circuit eventually vacated 
this aspect of the decision,156 the court was careful to limit its hold­
ing to the funding issue so as not to "prejudice the determination of 
the lawfulness of a more narrow order aimed at legal representation 
in this case itself."157 
C. New Hampshire Regulations Deny Meaningful Access 
In DDAC, plaintiffs contend that the regulations promulgated 
by LSS regarding visitation and access to records limits their ability 
to protect and advocate the rights of the residents}S8 According to 
the regulations, visits are encouraged, but only as to certain classes 
of people. Court appointed attorneys are included in this list, but 
not attorneys from programs like DDAC}59 If the client is over 
eighteen or does not have a guardian, or a guardianship petition 
pending, the client may authorize any person to visit, unless the ad­
ministrator "believes that the visit will adversely affect the client." 160 
If the client is under eighteen or has a guardian, then the guardian or 
parent may authorize visits, subject to the same limitations by the 
administrator. 161 If the visit has not been authorized by either of the 
above sections, or where a guardianship proceeding has been insti­
tuted, the administrator shall investigate to determine whether the 
visit would adversely affect the client. This decision must be made 
within five working days of the request. 162 Nowhere in the regula­
tions is the term "adversely affe.cted" defined, nor are any guidelines 
drawn to determine how this standard is to be applied. Thus, a cli­
ent's wish to see an attorney is within the discretion of the adminis­
trator, while a court appointed attorney is allowed visitation 
privileges. 
Similarly, access to client records is limited to certain, arbitrary 
154. Brewster v. Dukabs, 520 F. Supp. 882,890, vacated and remanded, 687 F.2d 
495 (1st Cir. 1982). 
155. Id at 891-92. 
156. Brester v. Dukakis, 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982). 
157. Id at 500-0l. 
158. Brief of Appellants at 185-86a, supra note 18. 
159. Draft Regulations, supra note 18, § He-M 802.03(b). 
160. Id, § He-M 802.05(d). 
161. Id, § He-M 802.06. 
162. Id, § He-M 802.07. 
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classes of people. Clients over eighteen and without a guardian may 
authorize others to have access to their records. 163 If a guardian has 
been appointed, that person may also authorize such access}64 If a 
guardianship proceeding has been instituted, the superintendent may 
grant access, unless the release of information would have an ad­
verse effect on the client. 165 Only a court appointed attorney shall 
have limited access to a client's records. 166 
The effect of these regulations is clear. If a client under the age 
of eighteen, or with a guardian, wishes to challenge the actions of 
that parent or guardian, the parent or guardian has, in effect, a veto 
power on that individual's ability to seek legal help. Furthermore, if 
any client wishes to seek advice on a matter requiring immediate 
attention, the administrator has at least five days within which to 
decide whether to allow the DDAC's advocate permission to visit. 
By that time, irreparable harm may have .occurred. Even though an 
appeal process is included in the regulations, the complaint is han­
dled internally, by LSS officials}67 Even if the client is able to re­
ceive the visitor when requested, if the advocate cannot have access 
to the client's records, it would be very difficult for the advocate to 
engage in meaningful intervention. 
III. CONCLUSION 
By continuing to fund LSS, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services "has continued to place his imprimatur on the State of New 
Hampshire's state plan requiTed by the [DD] Act, and has appar­
ently determined that New Hampshire substantially complies with 
the Act, for there is no indication that the Secretary has ever with­
held~r threatened to withhold-funds from the State."168 DDAC 
is New Hampshire's protection and advocacy system required by 
section 6012 of the DD Act}69 The need for such an advocacy sys­
tem clearly has been demonstrated,l1° yet the regulations promul­
gated by the state make it difficult, if not impossible for it to provide 
any meaningful protection or advocacy}71 New Hampshire, there­
163. fd. § He-M 803.07. 
164. fd 
165. fd. § He-M 803.07(c). 
166. fd.§803.1O. 
167. fd. § 802.10. 
168. Garrity v. Gallen. 522 F. Supp. at 203. 
169. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text. 

17 \. See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text. 
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fore, is not in substantial compliance with the DD Act. If an amend­
ment to the complaint is allowed, alleging that the Secretary has 
breached his duty by approving New Hampshire's plan,172 and the 
plaintiffs prevail, New Hampshire will be faced with the decision 
either to comply with the conditions of the Act or face losing federal 
financial support. 
Nancy B. Alisberg 
172. See supra note 105-06, 168 and accompanying text. 
